The presence of additional flight crew on the flight deck over and above the standard two crew complement can be a challenge for some Primary Operating Crew to manage. Wavering between under utilisation where the Relief Crew sit and twiddle their thumbs, to over utilisation where the Captain spends so much time telling the Second Officer what to do next (as well as what the SO’s doing wrong) that his own tasks suffer. Yes, these are the extremes and over simplifications / dramatisations; but at times, not by much.

There are a couple of Asian airlines that operate with 4 crew (2 Relief Crew) who relegate the Relief Crew to the passenger compartment during pre-flight, waiting to be told when to come up to the flight deck to start relief duties. One presumes that in those airlines their presence on the flight deck overall was considered more a hindrance than a usefulness.

The role of a Relief Crew member on a flight deck can also be a challenging one. Decades of research and documentation clearly define the roles of Cisco and Pancho on the flight deck. No one defines what Diablo was supposed to do, unless Diablo was there for his engineering expertise (a Flight Engineer) in which case in effect, he was a Primary Crew member. SOPs rarely define roles for Relief Crew outside of some generic tasks that actually belong to the Primary Crew but can be delegated; including checking status of emergency equipment and documentation; the presence of pillows and blankets in Crew Rest; tidying up and other such duties. My company is presently going down the road of doing so and it’s a minefield, I can tell you. I have SOPs from a couple of Asian airlines as well as a few of the US ones which have done so. I like the US ones.

It’s Relief Crew.

Our airline runs with a Captain and First Officer as the Primary Crew; and two Relief First Officers as Relief Crew. I prefer to refer to any crew member who is on the flight deck ostensibly for the purposes of providing in flight cruise relief as Relief Crew rather than by their grades (Second Officer, Cruise Pilot, etc) because that’s what they are – fully qualified crew who are there for relief purposes. In my airline as I function more often as a Relief Crew member than a Primary Crew member because I’m always sitting on the jump seat as a Check Captain, with at least one other Captain on board and in Command. In my previous airline, we had only Captains and First Officers hence the Relief Crew were another Captain and First Officer. Thus as far as I’m concerned – it’s the Relief Crew and the Primary (or Operating) Crew.

So based on my lessons learnt in the past as a Second Officer, my time spent as a First Officer, Captain, Training and Check Captain, time spent as a member of both Primary and Relief Crew – looking back here are some thoughts. I’m not going to try and tell Primary Crew how to manage Relief Crew – that’s for a committee to work out. But from watching and doing, here are some suggestions of the more common things I see a Relief Crew member could improve on – whether you’re a newbie or a seasoned aviator, sitting back there watching from the seats that see all.

This is not a manifesto – it’s certainly not SOP or policy for my current airline or any other airline I’ve ever worked for; neither is it ordered. This is more of a personal criticism of my own time as a Relief Pilot (from both an SO and a Check Captain). Think of it as random thoughts seeking to promote discussion. Here goes.

Highlighting Primary Crew Omissions/Mistakes

One of the roles of the Relief Crew Member is to provide backup to the robust primary multi crew procedures and calls already established to detect and correct errors and omissions on the flight deck. It is important that the Relief Crew Member allow the primary crew to use these established procedures to self detect/correct – as a crew – before providing correcting input from the relief crew seat.

An example would be a mis-selected AFDS setting such as a heading or an altitude in response to an ATC instruction. While compliance with ATC clearances are paramount in such situations and a Relief Crew Member must speak up promptly if a clearance limit exceedance is imminent – ideally the Relief Crew Member should give the Primary Crew the opportunity to self correct.

Timing is Everything

There are times when Relief Crew must weigh the potential consequence of a Primary Crew Slip/Omission against the possible consequences of speaking up immediately.

At one extreme – highlighting the lack of external aircraft lighting at speed during the takeoff roll would not be considered an appropriate contribution to the sterile flight deck environment.

Less obvious would be the omission of turning the exerior lights off as the aircraft passes 10,000 ft on climb. While the fallacy of speaking up during takeoff case is clear to all, for this second event an appropriate Relief Crew response might be to wait until past transition altitude, wait until not approaching a cleared level and clear of ATC communications before identifying the omission.

As any Sim Instructor can tell you – there is a world of difference between the operating and non-operating seats on a flight deck. While potentially the Relief Crew Member has more brain capacity to monitor and catch omissions than either the PF or PM; at times it’s also not unusual for the Relief Crew member to miss an element of a situatuion, rendering less significant – or even irrelevant – an omission detected from the relief seats. If situation permits the time available to sit on your hands for a minute or two and review – it’s not a bad idea (again, also gives the Prmary Crew more time to self-correct).

Apologise when you’re Right

As much as timing can be everything – contributions from the Relief Crew made in a challenging or derogatory manner are also be contributory to a poor flight deck environment. Years ago as a Second Officer I was taught by a Senior Check Captain that anytime I was contributing to the flight deck in such a way that I was right and the Primary Crew were wrong – the best course of action was to accompany the correction with an implied apology.

At first glance this seems like a strange technique but if you think about it – it works. Most professional pilots are perfectionists and as much as CRM teaches us that we all make mistakes and the correction of those mistakes by a team member leads to a better overall solution and is entirely normal and expected; still corrections from Relief Crew are sometimes seen internally as personal deficiencies by Primary Crew.

Additionally some pilots who have extensive (or very little) two crew experience sometimes have difficulty in adapting to corrections and suggestions from relief crew. Corrections offered in the manner of suggestion or inquiry often achieve the desired result in a less confrontational manner than when offerred in such a way as to be perceived by a particularly sensitive pilot as criticism – and you often can’t tell that’s the way it was received.

Say what you want – I learnt this techique as a 23 year old second officer on a 747-400 and I use it now as a check captain correcting 23 year old second officers in the simulator during training and checking. Back then it ensured the best chance of getting my point across while maintaining the relationship. Now it disarms defensiveness and self-recrimination and encourages a good opportunity for discussion and learning in the training environment.

Conflict

Sometimes error/slip corrections proferred by Relief Crew are not welcomed by the Primary Crew. This can be for many reasons – because the issue is not seen as important at the time by the Primary Crew; because circumstances un-noticed by the Relief Crew invalidate the comment; because the Primary Crew are under significant workload and their stress levels are high; etc. There is seldom a good reason for Primary Crew to snap back at a Relief Crew Member after raising a concern – it is almost always an unusual behaviour brought on by circumstances and should be treated that way.

In the end, the reasons for primary crew irritability are irrelevant. As the SO, having voiced your concern your role is complete. There are however two clear mistakes that the Relief Crew Member can make in response. The first is to disengage from the monitoring role. CRM from the 80′s taught us that when a Captain snaps at a First Officer so as to (momentarily at least) destroy the two crew relationship on a flight deck – there are two failed parties involved. The Captain who initiated the disengaging act – and the First Officer who disengaged. As a Relief Crew Member, when you feel you’ve been unfairly treated – disengagement is never an appropriate response.

The second mistake is to respond and become involved in a “discussion” about the event or subsequent interaction. Your aim was to highlight a problem and you’ve done that. The fact that you got your head snapped off for it is wrong – but irrelevant. Be the bigger person and don’t respond to perceived provocation. The tense environment of takeoff, climb, descent, approach, landing and non-normal operations can produce role interactions that the participants wouldn’t dream of elsewhere. The Bus or the Bar are usually the best times to commence a discussion of such an event.

Thoughts? Don’t all flame me at once …

Original post and comments from: flight.org

Relief Crew on the Flight Deck

First, look at this video of a group of basketball players and count exactly how many passes the team in white makes. It directly relates to the other two videos below.

This is one of a number of videos that are commonly used in human factors and Crew Resource Management courses to illustrate how fixation can distract us from more obvious (and more important) issues.

Now, watch these two videos. The first is an unintentional gear-up landing in a Cessna 172RG; the second is another unintentional gear-up landing a Trinidad.

Note the similarities? In both cases, the aircraft was high on an unstablized approach. In both cases there were two pilots occupying the front seats, and more disturbingly, the entire ‘crew’ didn’t acknowledge the ‘configuration’ warning horn.

In most light aircraft with a retractable undercarriage, the aircraft’s logic will identify that the machine isn’t correctly configured for the current phase of flight (in this case, flaps down with low power and no gear extended) and it will emit a warning horn to alert the pilot. In both of the above cases it’s possible that the crew didn’t even register the warning horn because of a fixation (or tunnel vision) on correcting what they believed to be the more immediate problem: the high approach. It’s also possible that they heard the horn but falsely determined that it was alerting them to another issues (such as simply low power). At the same time, they developed a blinkered approach to the world around them and harnessed virtually every square inch of brain capacity to deal with a problem that they weren’t familiar with. The situation led to a complete loss of situational awareness.

Confirmation bias (a type of cognitive bias) is an inherent and stubborn flaw in the human condition. We like to validate our decisions and actions without a broader consideration outside the diagnosis that we initially form early on – and we’re inherently biased and emotionally motivated to form a hypothesis to support an original belief. We sometimes become completely invested in a decision and consumed with whatever action is required to confirm our original opinion (aggravated by the fact that we don’t have spare brain capacity to question what we’re doing). The two cases above tends to support the psycho-babble that suggests confidence systematically exceeds accuracy; implying people are more sure that they are correct than they deserve to be… of that they become so task-saturated that they don’t have spare cognitive processing power to question their actions. This overconfidence leads to a situation where we form an irrational escalation of commitment, or commitment bias, leading to anchoring (or tunnel vision) that we described above. The longer we vacate dynamic lateral thinking and tolerate a cognitive dissonance, the more and more we commit to a bad decision and “make the wrong decision the right decision”.

The Illusion of Control

There’s some interesting discussion relating to low time pilots (or any pilot that lacks currency) and the illusion of control. The principle is based around the belief that some pilots form a type of confidence that they have some measure of control when in fact they have very little. Their illusory superiority (and optimism bias) is supported by hanger talk, the validation from others, paper qualifications, previous competency and other external influences that serves to inflate an individual’s personal ego. Basically, just because we’re qualified at something doesn’t necessarily mean that we’re any good at it (despite what our mother keeps telling us). This means we need checklists and SOP’s, and we need visualisation or briefings and procedures to mitigate the potential for a screw up! Also, just because we have currency doesn’t necessarily mean we have competency… there are countless sequences none of us get to physically practice in the course of normal flying. It’s only when we screw the pooch that we’re alerted to our expired skill set – just ask any Airbus pilot.

“Ability”

The interpretation or construct behind “ability” is hard to measure when the individuals concerned don’t have constant oversight or evaluation (this especially applies to private pilots). An appreciation (or the illusion) of individual ability does not necessarily translate into an aircraft [we can only assume that the pilots had confidence in their ability to accurately fly with aircraft]. Pilots need to create a real disconnect that separates what they would like to be true with what is actually true (egocentrism is an overtly self-serving bias placing importance and significance on a pilots ability rather than his or her weaknesses). There are interesting cases of heavy jet pilots that suffer from the same condition… usually identified as a threat in preflight.

In a multi crew aircraft, we’re taught to disengage from what our ego is telling us and connect more with SOP’s, procedures and modal awareness. Although it’s possible for both pilots to form a confirmation bias relating to the same error or judgement, we have more procedures and training in place to mitigate the potential for those types of obvious errors… although it does happen. Global configuration occurrences occur almost daily – with higher numbers estimated than is known due to lack of certain reporting cultures. A few Aussie examples of situationally unaware pilots are described below.

ATSB Investigation Number: AO-2009-066

On October 26, 2010, a Boeing 767 operated by Qantas Airways conducted a go-around due to an “incorrectly configured” aircraft (read: the gear wasn’t down). The ATSB report states that “Approaching 500 ft on approach into Sydney, the crew commenced a missed approach due to the aircraft being incorrectly configured for landing. During the commencement of the missed approach the ‘too low gear’ GPWS warning activated”. The ATSB concluded, not surprisingly, that “the incorrect aircraft configuration was the result of several interruptions and distractions during the approach. These interruptions and distractions resulted in a breakdown in the pilots’ situational awareness.”

ATSB Investigation Number: AO-2011-089

On the 28th July, 2011, A Jetstar A320 was passing 245 feet on arrival into Melbourne when the crew received a ‘TOO LOW FLAP’ aural and visual warning from the aircraft’s enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS). On this occasion, an unstablised approach led to a (tunnel vision type) situation where flaps weren’t configured for landing and the landing checklist wasn’t completed. This case highlights countless other issues of competency arising from a 300 hour co-pilot that was essentially “under training” tasked with an inexperienced captain (lending itself to the argument that supports a minimum of 1500 hours of ‘real’ experience for high capacity RPT operations… but that’s another story!). The co-pilot was so overwhelmed and disconnected from what was going on in this situation that he failed to raise flaps after the go-around. This ATSB report reads like a slapstick comedy.

ATSB Investigation Number: AO-2010-035

Only a few days ago, the ATSB published final findings into a Jetstar A320 bound for Changi International Airport on the 27th May, 2010. The investigation identified several events on the flight deck during the approach that distracted the crew to the point where their situation awareness was lost, decision making was affected and inter‑crew communication degraded. The aircraft descended below 500 feet with the gear still in transit. Again, a GPWS alert was issued. One of the more disturbing aspects of this incident is that the primary ‘distraction’ on the flight deck consisted of the captain reading text messages on his mobile phone. The statement on the Jetstar website serves as an indicment against their culture. It reads, in part, “The ATSB report made no findings against Jetstar, nor did it find any fault with Jetstar’s policies or procedures. The safety of the aircraft was never compromised.” What Rubbish…

In all the cases described above, the approaches were reported as unstabilised leading to a loss of situational awareness. In all cases, even when the crew acknowledged their error, the aircraft – the last line of automated defence – alerted them to their oversight. We generally don’t have this level of redundancy in light aircraft!

Although the gear-up landing was the ultimate result in both of the above videos, the opportunity to correct the approach should have occurred far earlier. Landing checklists, flows, flying school SOP’s and stabilized criteria through certain “gates” (that specify certain performance criteria on, say, downwind, base, final and “over the fence”) are taught at most schools to mitigate the risk of such an occurrence. The last line of defence against such errors taking place relies upon the pilot to simply have a good understanding of the aircraft they’re flying. That is, an appreciation of what is “normal” for most conditions of flight.

In my former instructional days, nothing was more important than seeing the pilot under training have an understanding of what the aircraft was doing and why it was doing it (otherwise, we’re nothing more than passengers at the controls). If they ever found themselves in a position where they didn’t meet certain conditions at various gates throughout any phase of flight, I wanted them to ask one question – “why?“. Acknowledge the problem and identify the cause… then implement a solution. An appropriate solution or response won’t be reached until we know exactly what it is we’re meant to fix. If all else fails and the aircraft doesn’t respond as it should… go around.

Another question every pilot should ask themselves is “what should I expect?“. It’s unacceptable for a pilot to become aware of a strong tailwind on base when wind information was provided in an ATIS weather report or from forecast conditions. An arsenal of pre-circuit knowledge will alert the crew to planned power settings and the expected configuration. Optimistic bias is caused by cognitive mechanisms that guide judgments and decision-making processes – meaning, simply, that the more we know; the less likely we are to make an error. This applies to reactive decisions we make in the air but it also means that a well-read, briefed or educated pilot is simply better equipped to make superior decisions before they even leave the ground. In the situations above, a simple pre-circuit briefing would have armed the pilots with sufficient knowledge to fly the approach proactively; meaning that they likely wouldn’t have become high in the first place.

Any instruction from a flying school that encourages a continued unstablized approach in any condition other than a non-normal situation is essentially validating unsafe flying. It’s negative learning from a student’s perspective and negligence on the part of the teacher.

Professional Pilots Screw Up Too – Fixation

There are only a few accidents more infamous than Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 and its controlled flight into terrain. The entire crew of four became so fixated on repairing a green landing light indication that they weren’t aware that the aircraft disengaged from the autopilot pitch mode into what’s known as Control Wheel Steering, or CWS – a relatively new technology at the time. CWS will essentially hold whatever attitude the pilot selects (think of it as a ‘trimming mode’ after manually moving the controls out of autopilot). The aircraft descended without the knowledge of the crew while they attended to the light… and the fully serviceable aircraft crashed into the Florida Everglades causing 101 fatalities.

Professional Pilots Ignore Audible Warnings Too

On February 19, 1989, a Boeing 747-200 operating as Flying Tiger 66 was operating an international cargo flight into Kuala Lumpur. Conducting an unfamiliar NDB approach at night, the crew flew what can only be described as unstabilised approach – due in part to their complete lack of situational awareness. They crashed into terrain 12 miles from the airport. Numerous warnings were provided by the GPWS (Ground Proximity Warning System) and all were ignored by the flight crew (not unlike the Cessna’s warning horn). All four crew were killed.

It’s argued that the crew ignored the GPWS as a result of the new (at the time) technology providing erroneous callouts. In any case -and despite what was clearly a rushed approach – no crewmember even acknowledged the repeated calls. Not unlike the two gear-up cases, it’s plausible that the crew didn’t acknowledge the calls by virtue of their fixation on the approach that they were incorrectly flying. Although it’s important to watch the entire video to fully understand the circumstances surrounding the confusion, the GPWS calls are made at about the 8:50 mark.

The Lesson?

An obvious statement: The more you look out and are trained to identify an anomoly or error, the more obvious it becomes. Situational awareness, SOP’s, procedures, training, and knowledge and understanding of your aircraft and the conditions and/or performance of your aircraft and operation are paramount. You don’t have to be a paid professional pilot to be a professional aviator.

References

• NTSB report for Cessna Gear Up Landing.
• NTSB report: Eastern Airlines L-1011, N310EA – PDF
• Jetstar A320 (VH-VQA) Configuration, Melbourne Airport, 28 July 2011
• Jetstar A320 (VH-VWW) Configuration, Changi Int. Airport, 27 May 2010
• Qantas B767 (VH-OGP) Configuration, Sydney Airport, 26 October 2009
• Flight Safety Foundation ALAR Briefing Notes

Original post and comments from: flight.org

Gear Up Landings and Pilot Error

From the Transport Safety Board of Canada findings:

[T]he aircraft pitch changed from the cruise attitude of 2 degrees nose up, to 6 degrees nose down followed by a return to 2 degrees nose up. The vertical acceleration forces (g) went to −0.5 g to +2.0 g in 5 seconds. Computed airspeed increased 7 knots then decreased 14 knots before recovering to cruise speed with the aircraft’s altitude decreasing to 34 600 feet increasing to 35 400 feet and finally recovering to 35 000 feet.

Despite the illuminated seat belt sign, some passengers were not restrained and suffered minor injuries.

A relief pilot in the passenger cabin (that was to serve as a relief pilot for the return sector) was sensibly (and admirably) called to the flight deck to monitor the progress of the crew for the remainder of the flight.

Is it normal for Pilots to Sleep on the Flight Deck?

Despite what many people believe, it is normal for most airlines to have a strategic ‘controlled rest’ program in place as a genuine tool to mitigate the effects of fatigue. Strict procedures are usually put in place to ensure that the pilot only receives rest – not a deep sleep – and other actions are taken to ensure safe continuance of flight with what essentially becomes a single-pilot operation. It’s the FO’s lengthy “sleep” that was the single most obvious factor causing the incident.

What is Sleep Inertia?

Have you ever woken up after a sleep and responded to a situation that flowed from a dream? Have you ever woken up and not realised where you were (extremely common amongst airline pilots)? Have you ever woken up struggled to determine if it was a work day or day off? Sleep intertia is the post–sleep performance decrement and grogginess that occurs immediately after awakening. It’s essentially the continuance of a sleeplike state after you regain ‘consciousness’… and it poses a serious threat to the ‘controlled’ rest process.

Strangely, the exact purpose of the various cycles of sleep are largely unknown. What is known, however, is that REM (Rapid Eye Movement) sleep is the deepest sleep and is most likely to cause short-term performance deteriorations if woken.

REM Sleep: Stages (vertically) and hours (horizontally)

Non-REM dreams (during the first 40-60 minutes of sleep and then staggered thereafter) are more likely to consist of brief, fragmentary impressions that are less emotional, less vivid, and less likely to involve visual images than REM sleep dreams. If woken up during periods of REM sleep, it’s possible that the vivid imagery might translate to the woken state and cause the pilot to carry his sleeping thoughts into the real world. It’s believed that stage four sleep is also quite vivid and is the phase of sleep most responsible for nightmares. These deep stages or sleep should be avoided on the flight deck. Controlled rest is normally limited to 20-30 minutes for most carriers to ensure that the pilot avoids any REM cycle. In fact, most physiologists suggest pilots avoid anything beyond stage 2 sleep.

Video: This video shows a dog reacting to sleep inertia [Credit: YouTube user MarinaHD2001].

From the TC report:

With a view to providing a substantial rest, the captain allowed the FO to rest beyond the 40–minute maximum set as a defence against entering slow–wave sleep; the 75–minute rest that ensued increased the probability of entering slow–wave [REM] sleep. The severity and duration of sleep inertia are more likely to be worse if a person is awakened from slow–wave sleep, especially if the rest occurs at a circadian low and when the person is fatigued. Given the consistency between the conditions that worsen sleep inertia and the FO’s sleep and controlled rest, and the observation that the FO felt unwell when awakened, it is likely that the FO was suffering from high levels of sleep inertia.

In a post-incident interview with the captain and other crew working for the airline, it was identified that staff generally had a poor understanding of the dangers involved with lengthy controlled rest (suggesting a sub-par human factors and CRM program). The airline subsequently issued bulletins to crew alerting them to published procedures.

This incident barely scratches the scratch relating to broader and more relevant fatigure related issue & discussions.

The situation could have been worse. Consider a situation where a pilot woke in a state where he believed he was responding to an emergency. He might pull engine switches, fire handles or – not dissimilar to the situation described above – aggressively handle the aircraft in such a way that it causes serious controllability issues.

Controlled rest seems to be largely misunderstood by the travelling public. Remember the photo of a sleeping Cathay Pacific captain in 2011?

Cathay quickly responded to the clueless news reports with a statement that read, in part, “This photograph should not be taken out of context as it would appear to illustrate ‘controlled rest’, which occurs in cockpits of many of the best airlines in the world. This includes Cathay Pacific, which allows controlled rest under strictly controlled conditions, which permit one pilot of a two-crew aircraft, to take a short rest during low workload periods during the cruise only… the controlled rest period would have lasted 40 minutes at most, during which time the co-pilot would have full control.”

If you’re a passenger, how do you respond to the idea of “controlled rest”? If you’re a pilot, what measure to you or your airline take to combat fatigue?

Original post and comments from: flight.org

767 Near-Miss with the Planet Venus

What is WordPress shortcode? Shortcode is basically WordPress specific functionality that provides a powerful “find and replace” feature that searches for a specific string of text in a post (before it is sent to your screen) and replaces it with the output of a coded function that is designed to “do something”. For example, we’ve previously provided shortcode that would render a TAF or METAR in your post by using a very short string of text. Shortcode can be tricky if you’re not overly tech savvy, so if you require assistance, please let us know.

The purpose of this shortcode is to emulate indications one would expect to see in glass cockpit Boeing aircraft. I wanted to replicate the general look of the indications or switches that are presented to the pilot. Most notably, I wanted to emulate the Flight Mode Annunciations (as displayed on the FMA), basic modes that one would select on the Mode Control Panel (MCP)… and I also wanted a basic means of formatting text to resemble FMC buttons or CDU text. Used in blog posts and technical articles, the visual representation is far more likely to reinforce a principle in the mind of the reader.

I’ve recently completed a transition from the 777 to the Boeing 737. As part of my continued effort to maintain knowledge of the aircraft I’ll be building a website at SevenThreeSeven.com. I’m using the following shortcode quite heavily in a chapter relating to automation.

Flight Mode Annunciations (FMA)

The Flight Mode Annunicator, or FMA, is the aircraft’s way of communicating the current mode of autoflight or operation. The FMA indicates to the crew where the aircraft is obtaining thrust, lateral navigation and pitch information (or guidance) for flight.

For example, the FMA indication of SPD | LNAV | VNAV PATH indicates that the thrust mode controls speed (via an FMC value), the lateral navigation of the aircraft is determined by an active lateral track, and VNAV PATH indicates that vertical navigation is commanded by a vertical FMC profile. Of course, sometimes it’s necessary for authors to discuss one mode of operation in isolation of any other… in which case they could render that information as, for example, VNAV SPD.

The Flight Mode Annunciation (FMA) at the top of the Primary Flight Display (PFD)

The Shortcode

For the three FMA indications, the author would simply insert the following shortcode into the HMTL view of their post editor:

If the author wanted to output only a single FMA indication, they would simply insert the following into their HTML post editor:

If you wanted to represent an armed mode rather than the current active mode (such as FLARE – note text is white rather than green), you would do so by specifying the fontcolor in your shortcode.

The Mode Control Panel (MCP)

It’s often necessary to render MCP ‘switches’ in a post. Styling the text to look like the actual MCP switch leaves little doubt that the text relates directly to a switch in the aircraft. For example, when referring to the Level Change switch on the MCP, we could do so as LVL CHG.

The Boeing 777 Mode Control Panel (MCP)

Having multiple styling options ensures we don’t confuse, for example, an MCP LNAV switch with an LNAV FMA annunciation.

The Shortcode

To style text with the feel of the MCP, the following shortcode should be used:

FMC Messages

I generally represent the FMC keyboard or CDU scratchpad by way of a simple grey style. For example, I could quickly style the FMC cruise button as  CRZ  or VNAV page as  VNAV .

The Shortcode

To style text with the feel of a FMC key or CDU scrathpad text, the following shortcode should be used:

Changing Formatting

Any of the parameters in the shortcode can be altered to change the look and feel of text. For example, the shortcode below would render  text like this .

By changing the default options in the shortcode, you can easily create your own default formatting.

Full Width FMA Annunciations

Sometimes it’s necessary to feature FMA indications the full width of your post. Rather than using a screenshot of an image, I’m using shortcode to emulate the FMA with armed modes in addition to active modes. Consider the following example (that you wouldn’t expect to see in the aircraft… it’s just an example).

If you’re one of the few that requires this kind of functionality in your post, get in touch with me.

The Code

You should copy the code from here rather than copying from below (to minimise the risk of copy errors). The shortcode should be copied into your theme’s functions.php file.

FMA Shortcode

function fma_indications($atts) {
extract(shortcode_atts(array(
    'thrust' => '',
    'roll' => '',
    'pitch' => '',
    'bgcolor' => '#333333',
    'bordercolor' => '#333333',
    'borderwidth' => '2px',
    'bordertype' => 'solid',
    'fontcolor' => '#00ff00',
  ), $atts));
  if ( ($thrust) && ($roll) && ($pitch) ) {
  return "<font style=\"padding: 1px 1px 1px 1px; color: $fontcolor; background-color: $bgcolor; border: $bordercolor $border $bordertype $borderwidth\">$thrust <font color=\"#cccccc\">|</font> $roll <font color=\"#cccccc\">|</font> $pitch</font>";
  } else {
  return "<font style=\"padding: 1px 1px 1px 1px; color: $fontcolor; background-color: $bgcolor; border: $bordercolor $border $bordertype $borderwidth\">$thrust$roll$pitch</font>";
 }
}
add_shortcode('fma','fma_indications');

MCP Shortcode

function modecontrolpanel($atts, $content = null ) {
extract(shortcode_atts(array(
    'bgcolor' => '#906a53',
    'bordercolor' => '#906a53',
    'borderwidth' => '0.5px',
    'bordertype' => 'solid',
    'fontcolor' => '#ffffff',
  ), $atts));
  return "<font style=\"padding: 1px 1px 1px 1px; color: $fontcolor; background-color: $bgcolor; border: $bordercolor $border $bordertype $borderwidth\">$content</font>";
}
add_shortcode('mcp','modecontrolpanel');

FMC Shortcode

function fmc_cdu($atts, $content = null ) {
extract(shortcode_atts(array(
    'bgcolor' => '#e5e5e5',
    'bordercolor' => '#000000',
    'borderwidth' => '1px',
    'bordertype' => 'solid',
    'fontcolor' => '#000000',
  ), $atts));
  return "<font style=\"padding: 1px 1px 1px 1px; color: $fontcolor; background-color: $bgcolor; border: $bordercolor $border $bordertype $borderwidth\">&nbsp;$content&nbsp;</font>";
}
add_shortcode('fmc','fmc_cdu');

If you end up using the above code, a link back to us would be nice :)

Original post and comments from: flight.org

WordPress Shortcode for FMA Annunciations, FMC Messages & the MCP

After my recent debacle in Abu Dhabi – and another occurrence involving offload and a 4 hour delay- I was asked to prepare some specific advice for Captains operating out of Abu Dhabi.

Background

Due to high temperatures, most Abu Dhabi departures during mid Summer experience a potential performance penalty for departure; in most cases resulting in loss of revenue payload, possible departure delays due offload and in the severest of cases the offload of all Cargo, Standby Passengers/Bags and Revenue Passenger Bags to enable departure.

Green is Dep. Time. Yellow is Peak Temp

At this time of year the midday temperatures in OMAA are in the mid 40°’s. When contrasted with the average load carrying capability for our 777’s in these temperatures; and the high loads of passengers and freight departing Abu Dhabi during Summer – it’s clear that crew will be required to plan for a performance limitation on takeoff.

Note : The data provided here is for information only and not for operational use. Any statements of rules of thumb; values of temperatures and winds; preferred runway selections; performance limit weight changes due ambient conditions such as Temperature, Wind, Runway Selection, APU-PACK usage etc are informational only – all takeoff performance estimates must be verified and calculated by the crew in the actual operating environment of the day.

Considerations

Effect of Temperature

From the charted data – it can be seen that increasing temperature has a significant impact on the load carrying capability of the aircraft. Once below the Certified Takeoff Weight, each degree increase reduces the takeoff performance limit by at least 3.0 Tons – often more.

Assuming a full load of passengers and crew – at planning temperatures of 40° and less, some revenue cargo can be carried for the departure.

Yellow areas are likely Pax-Only Dep

However as the temperature increases, the performance limiting condition reaches a point where revenue cargo cannot be carried. In a highly subjective calculation – this is indicated by the yellow/bold sections of this sample chart. Your mileage may vary.

Effect of Wind

It can be seen that an increasing headwind component helps increase load carrying capacity by an average of 300 Kg/Knot. However this rule of thumb is far from reliable because there are points at which headwind helps with a specific performance limit and the increase in permitted takeoff weight is higher (900 Kg in some cases for 1 knot increase in wind). Crew must examine various contingencies of the wind before deciding on a planned set of departure conditions.

Departure Time

Our departure time of 11:00 am leads up towards the peak heat of the day. This has two operational impacts. Temperatures are high and therefore our capacity to fill the aircraft is compromised. Additionally any significant delay to the departure – such as to offload cargo/standby passengers in order to comply with a weight restriction –takes the aircraft into even higher operating temperatures. Once into this peak temperature regime (about 14:00 Local) it can be up to 4 hours after Scheduled ETD before temperatures reduce.

Sea Breeze

During the morning temperatures build and OMAA general experiences southerly (crosswind) to easterly (HWC RW 13) winds of up to 10 knots. That said – usually the breeze is less than 5 knots and of variable direction.

Between late morning and early afternoon a wind change is usually experienced (RW13 -> RW31) and winds of up to 10 knots can result. Once the sea breeze is established it’s normal for temperatures to commence a slow decrease through the rest of the afternoon.

Choice of Runway

All runways in Abu Dhabi are of equal length and approximately equal slopes (actually  0.05% up to North/West).

RW31L is preferred

APU to PACK

APU to PACK will generally provide a takeoff performance increase of about 3.5 Tons. Crew should familiarise themselves with the APU to PACK procedure from the FCOM SP during pre-flight; and consider reviewing the APU to PACK detail in the D5 OPT Guide prior to flight operations in Abu Dhabi.

APU To PACK in Abu Dhabi forces some additional operational considerations. Due to high on ground temperatures – with a full load the cabin temperature towards the back of the aircraft will be in the high twenties prior to engine start. As such the requirement to run two Packs out to the runway for passenger comfort is almost a certainty. Recommended technique is:

• Use conventional data entry procedures to enter all takeoff data as planned for the departure – even if you’re not sure those figures will be used for takeoff. Select APU in the Assumed Temperature line, verifying small font APU on the Upper EICAS.
• After engine start verify large font APU on Upper EICAS and Single Pack APU operation.
• If deemed necessary delete the APU entry in the Assumed Temperature line of the CDU THR LIM page and verify dual pack operation to the cabin. This action will delete the takeoff speeds from the FMC.
• Delay the Takeoff Review and Before Takeoff Checklist until final takeoff performance entries are complete
• Plan to position near the runway such that a short delay will be acceptable to ATC. When ready, perform the FMC Final Performance Entry procedure in full and re-enter takeoff performance data while the aircraft is halted with both operational crew involved as scripted.
• Complete Takeoff Review and the Before Takeoff Checklist when ready.
• If APU to Pack should fail – Turn the Packs OFF (refer to SP) nearing the runway (note 30 seconds minimum before thrust advancement) in place of APU to Pack.

Over Fuelling

When planned at 40° OAT – the flight can include 10-15 tons of cargo with a full load of passengers, based on a re-dispatched OFP fuel load. However if temperatures increase and a subsequent offload (or non-load) of Cargo is undertaken – even with 3 ton below refuelling the aircraft can be left with too much fuel to even depart with minimum passenger load.

If an over fuel situation develops, De-Fuelling is almost always NOT an option. One option to consider is pushback and taxi to hold near the runway – to wait for fuel reduction (minimum 2.0 tons per hour during taxi) or improved ambient conditions (post peak temperature, wind change, sea breeze).

Flight Planning

The Flight Plan will be prepared to a forecast temperature at the time of departure plus (based on recent operational experience) a margin. In all likelihood it will include some capacity for revenue freight.

If the flight is planned with Cargo, Captains should consider the following plan of action:

1. Obtain an estimate of the ZFW required for Revenue Pax/Bags and Standby Pax/Bags from the AUH Ramp Dispatcher.
2. Obtain a minimum fuel OFP from Nav Services for this ZFW.
3. Refuel the aircraft to this minimum fuel (instead of originally planned OFP less 3 tons)

This will enable the crew to decide to Offload/Not Load Cargo (and potentially Standby Passengers/bags) – and be left with just the fuel required to complete the mission, giving the minimum takeoff weight available for departure and therefore the greatest margin to the performance limited takeoff weight. Although the correction figures could be considered to correct for freight offload – the magnitude of values involved are beyond the accuracy of the LAND/RAMP correction figures.

PushBack, Taxi, Departure – Performance Entry

Pre-Flight : can be characterised by finger-flying calculations on the OPT; multiple sources of ambient conditions (Tower, ATIS, Aircraft OAT); changing ambient conditions; different ZFW/TOW figures provided from different sources. Captains must proactively manage these conditions and decide early on a plan to minimise the risks associated. The integrity of the Final OPT Calculation and the Data Entry Procedure is paramount.

Decision Time : There may come a point where the Captain will have to make a decision on a ZFW that can be accepted based on a conservative use of the OPT and expected temperatures/conditions. The decision to take on cargo and the fuel to carry it must be balanced against the possibility of increasing temperatures that could force a cargo offload – and a delay into even higher ambient temperatures for the departure.

Performance Data Entry : Captains may well find themselves having to enter critical performance data during taxi. It is strongly suggested this should be done in full compliance of the Final FMC Pre-Flight entry procedure after a full cross check of the final OPT solution (from scratch) involving both operational crew members while the aircraft is halted near the departure runway. Takeoff Review and Before Takeoff Checklist is delayed until the completion of the Performance Entry Procedure.

Original post and comments from: flight.org

High Temperature Departure – Abu Dhabi

If you sit on the flight deck in cruise, look around and consider the worst sequence of runway change – say from a long runway away from terrain and weather, to a shorter runway in a different direction towards terrain and weather – then roll your eyes over all the switches, buttons and knobs in the flight deck and all the FMC CDU pages and entries as well – there are dozens (at least) of potential changes required to action a runway change. All while taxiing for the new runway (not a good idea) or while stopped on the taxiway, blocking aircraft behind you (otherwise know as collateral damage). Oh, and you’re burning fuel (about 2000 kg/hr) at this point as well, I hope the runway change was towards your destination, rather than away from it.

In looking at all the changes required on the flight deck – did you miss the biggest one? The Pilots. Each pilot develops during pre-flight a mental model of the Departure, including aspects of aircraft movement across the ground and through the air, configuration during takeoff and what will be required to change that configuration airborne, direction of turn, acceleration, noise abatement, speed and altitude control and other more subtle aspects of the departure. In the midst of what can be quite frankly the chaos of a runway change on the run – you’ll need to re-build that mental model as well. Often it’s easier to get the plane to do the right thing after a runway change than it is to update the pilots on the full implications of the change on the flight.

Preparation for the expected runway and the associated development of a mental model is accomplished during pre-flight in a sequenced, logical, time pressure free flow (I know it doesn’t always seem that way …). Each time you depart, the majority of actions performed during pre-flight that relate to the specific runway are performed the same way each time, and runway specific items are not separated out from that process. We never set the flight deck up, calculate and cross check takeoff data, complete the Departure Briefing, then the Pre-Flight and Before Start Checklists – then finish of by doing all those items only related to the runway. Preparing for runway is integral in the pre-flight process – which is why determining the changes that must be made when the departure runway changes can be such a challenge.

In my previous company I was fortunate (?) to experience many runway changes. We flew a higher number of sectors each month, runway changes were, well if not common place, at least regular. As a line pilot, particularly a First Officer, I never gave it a great deal of thought – you just did what had to be done.

When I moved to the Left Hand Seat, I had a number of encounters which altered my world view. I suddenly found I was managing a runway change, rather than actioning one – and that made all the difference in the world (how many times has that been said by new Captains about 12 months after they upgrade …). Eventually I developed for myself a Runway Change Procedure and stuck it on the back of my Clipboard.

After that, every time I was subject to a runway change – whether on stand or approaching the runway – I reviewed it. Over time it grew a little, but it hasn’t really changed for quite a while.

When I commenced Training for my previous airline, it became even more useful. For some reason as a line trainer, I seemed to attract runway changes (more related to the nature of the multi sector flying than a personal vendetta by ATC, I hope …) and whether Cisco or Pancho (or Diablo) on the flight deck – I would pull it out and use it after making the change. My little checklist made it onto many other pilot’s clipboards as a result, and if you line trained with me in those days, there was always a lively discussion in cruise about runway changes.

As an aside – I have never been a fan of preparing more than one runway for departure. I would often see command training candidates, seeking to be prepared for any contingency on departure, who’d would prepare for multiple possible runways on departure. This would include the use of Route Two and preparing takeoff performance data for the possible runway change(s). Usually only two were involved – the planned runway and the most likely change. I see that practice regularly now with Abu Dhabi and occasionally Los Angeles and Sydney.

I remember on one memorable Singapore departure, where my budding Captain under training had 8 distinct sets of takeoff calculations going – two runways, variable winds, and it looked like rain … When he was considering two runways it looked simple enough but having started down that road …

In that particular instance we had one runway in the FMC, a different heading set on the MCP, and we’d briefed on the third possibility, with speeds and takeoff performance entered for a fourth (it’s amazing what you can achieve on a distracted flight deck during pre-flight) before I called a halt to the exercise and we started again. Some days you were just never meant to push back on time.

My advice – and that’s ALL it is, this is NOT policy – is prepare for just one runway. Set everything up for just one runway. By all means think about the possibilities – for example, if a runway change is possible, knowing whether you’ll be performance limited on that runway is a good thing – but keep your aircraft and your mind on one runway until that option is gone. Then start again with the new runway. I would also point out that while you can pre-calculate take off performance and write it down, when the change comes you should be sticking to procedures and pulling out the laptop for both calculation, cross check and data entry. So why confuse things? Nothing like having three sets of numbers written on the flight plan to incorrectly choose from when you’re checking data entry during pre-flight …

When I arrived at my present company I was fortunate to inherit the responsibility of establishing the aircraft SOPs. While I stuck as close to Boeing as I was comfortable with (accompanied by input from an extensive review of several other international 777 operator’s SOPs) I made sure that my little runway change procedure (above) was inserted into the Normal Procedures for the 777. During the few runway changes I’ve had, I’ve used the checklist. From discussion over the last few weeks, many other pilots have as well, contrasted with some of our pilots who have never seen it. Personally I now find with so little flying, it’s become indispensable, although clearly, I’m biased.

Owing to recent events, we are re-evaluating that checklist and moving it to a more accessible location on the flight deck (well, more accessible for others, it will stay in my clipboard for me). As part of that re-evaluation I reviewed updated documentation for several airlines and found that Delta and United both have similar a procedure. Focussed primarily on the FMC and impacted by their own specific type of performance limits – our new one certainly incorporates anything I’ve found in other airlines. The version below is a draft only and subject to approval, but hopefully we’ll see it soon in print. Certainly it’s availability in a more accessible form will highlight it’s existence to crew who are subject to runway changes in future.

Runway Change on Departure

A crew make dozens of entries, selections and decisions during pre-flight that are tied to a specific runway and the departure direction associated. In addition a complex mental model which includes terrain, weather and procedural implications is established by briefing and other thought developing processes. All of these are typically accomplished through practiced, familiar processes that happen in sequence and are the result of learned, practiced behaviours.

Hence a runway change – especially once the aircraft has begun to taxi – is a significant disruption to many aspects of safe flight. Dozens of changes are often required to ready the aircraft for flight, including changes to the aircraft setup:

• Airways Clearance and ATIS
• Take off performance calculation
• Aircraft Configuration (Flaps, Thrust)
• FMC (Runway, SID, Takeoff Performance)
• MCP (Modes, Heading, Altitude)
• Engine Out Procedure (Fix page, FMC EOAA)
• Departure Briefing

While most of these changes are mechanical in nature and can be the result of a checklist – such as the Runway Change Procedure shown here – more complex is the development of a pilot’s mental model of the taxi, takeoff and flight departure. This can generally only be achieved – particularly across the flight deck – by repeating/updating the Departure Briefing once the changes have been determined, evaluated and implemented in the flight deck.

Often the first indication of a previously unknown runway change is the direction of pushback in the push/start clearance. In this case the most appropriate response is usually to cancel push/start, remain on stand and action the change. While this can result in an OTP departure delay, it results in a better change action with less time pressure on the crew to accomplish what needs to be done.

Once the aircraft has begun to move, the recommended response to a runway change is to find an appropriate place for the aircraft to stop so all crew can be involved in the procedure. While relief crew can perform some useful preparation for a runway change during taxi, PF and PM should be fully engaged in ensuring safe taxi of the aircraft, rather than actioning a runway change procedure while the aircraft is moving.

The Final FMC Performance Entry procedure must be actioned in full no matter how small the changes involved in takeoff performance – from ZFW verification through to MCP and VNAV Climb Page Altitude/Fuel Checks. Once the Departure Briefing is updated the Takeoff Review and Before Takeoff Checklist must be completed (or repeated if necessary).

Original post and comments from: flight.org

Runway Change on Departure

On February 1, 2012, Thomas W. Horton (who replaced former Chairman and CEO Gerard Arpey) announced that they would be cutting 13,000 jobs and restructuring pension benefits, after losing $884M in the first nine months of 2011 and $904M in December 2011 alone.

A group of social media activists that call themselves You Can’t Steal My Happy (that, on the surface, seem to be profiteering from the company misfortune by selling t-shirts and mugs) have vented their frustration at the company by way of a YouTube video entitled, “American Airlines YAAY“, or Why American Airlines Why?, set to the music and theme of the Village People’s Y.M.C.A.

The video description reads:

This video is a tribute to all the hard working people who have been wronged by corporate greed. The song YAAY (Why American Airlines Why?) is our fun and creative way of expressing our frustration with corporate greed. This is a wake up call middle class, start asking WHY?!?

Original post and comments from: flight.org

Why American Airlines Why?

We got pretty lucky once we harvested UFO technology and progressed beyond the 386 processor. Affordable PC-based simulation was plentiful and certainly within easy reach of anybody that had committed the finances to flight training. No longer would you have to stand in an empty living space flying a broomstick around your house like a fool. Visualisation has its obvious benefits, but nothing beats being able to fly the actual procedures on a computer with animated indications preceding a structured flight lesson.

I was fortunate in that I taught countless instructor students over the years; unfortunate in that I didn’t actually get to fly any approaches. However, sitting back criticizing (one of my favorite things to do) was almost as good as actually getting my hands dirty. The principles were cemented so deeply into my psyche that I’d never forget – or so I thought…

When instructing became less of a financial option, I reluctantly stuck to my day job in aircraft that were all fitted with funky radios and/or glass cockpits, and I concentrated on the type of teaching that required less of a commitment. All of a sudden, my raw IFR skills began to deteriorate without my knowing it. I thought I knew what was going on… or at least that’s what I kept telling myself. It’s hard to validate our ego when we constantly let the aircraft do all the heavy lifting. Even the instrument ratings I flew in the 777 were conducted on autopilot (since it’s an automated machine). The only NDB approach we ever flew in the 777 was the old twin locator onto Melbourne’s RWY 16 – but even then we used an overlay and flew it in VNAV PATH. Not only was I not really flying an NDB approach, but the aircraft would fly the vertical path and, of course, compensate for any wind. I didn’t even touch the controls.

In my case, years had passed… and so did the need to have the same level of proficiency that I once did when it came to ground-based navigation. Simply put, the automation made me lazy (sound familiar, Karlene?)

Fast forward to present day. It was only a few weeks ago where I flew a company check ride (Operator Proficiency Check) in a Boeing 737. When it came time to fly the same twin locator into Melbourne I’d flown a hundred times before, the familiarity was all gone. I was hand flying (yes, actually flying) on one engine at night on approach to minimums. I had 30 knots of crosswind and both GPS systems had failed (the instructor quickly slewed the underlay off track so the beloved magenta track line wasn’t available). All of a sudden, I was essentially in one of those ‘little’ aircraft we throw sticks at when we taxi by. I found myself referring back to the principles that I hadn’t applied in years. Heading + Relative Bearing = Track to Station. Rule of Thumb: 5 degrees of drift for each 10 knots of wind (corrected). Head of the needle falls onto the track; tail falls. Thankfully – and I seriously mean thankfully – Gary from Digital Aviation had sent me a download link to his Radio Navigation Simulator a few days prior for a review. Little did I know that the 30 minutes I spent playing with his application was the reason I flew the approach so awesomely (if I do say so myself!)

I’m not ashamed to admit that most GA pilots could probably have flown that approach with far less brain power than I used on that day. There are basic principles that we let go of when we don’t use them often enough and I saw that first hand… in a flight test. I’ve got Gary’s RNS in my kit now and I’ll be sure to pull it out every now and again to refresh myself on all those basic principles that are far too easy to forget.

Radio Navigation Simulator

Produced by the father and son team at Digital Aviation, the Radio Navigation Simulator is currently only available on iOS devices – but it’s simply the best of its kind on any tablet platform.

Based on navaids around the United Kingdom, you “fly” a small aircraft with reference to two cockpit VOR’s, one ADF and a DME. Speed, altitude and wind can all be adjusted as necessary. Gesture supports zooming in and out and altering instrument indications. The instrument cluster can be minimized to maximize available airspace… although there are countless other options; far too many to talk about. Virtually any feature can be cycled on or off in real time.

A great feature for instrument and/or night students is the ability to simply drag the little aeroplane icon around the screen so that instrument indications reflect the change of location in real time.

The application is available in an iPhone/iPod touch only version for $4.99. The full version is $9.99. It shouldn’t be more than a few days before Gary rolls out additional features into the product that include new panel options (full HSI and dual needle RMI – NDB/VOR) and, additionally, support for the new iPad(3?) retina display. New “training areas” will also be included for “ab-initio” students looking at learning basic features before progressing onto more complex models.

Gary says that there are additional advanced features that will be made available over coming months but I’m not quite sure he’d want me sharing specific details. What he did describe to me makes an excellent product even better.

Features

• Flight Environment mapped in Latitude and Longitude.
• RNS operates with a Synthetic Aeronautical Database.
• The Radio Navigation Facilities area is approx 300 x 200 nm.
• Unrestricted Lat & Long flight outside of Facilities area.
• Area Navigation Facilities are VOR, VOR-DME and NDB.
• Scalable Chart with Facilities, Idents, and Aircraft symbols.
• Full Chart management with VOR Radials and Planned Routes.
• Aircraft Track Trail can be displayed, or suppressed.
• Flight Panel and Navigation Chart simultaneously displayed.
• Realistic Flight Panel with the following Instruments:
• VOR, DME, ADF (RMI or RBI) and Directional Gyro .
• Manageable Radios for ADF, NAV1 and NAV2 (with DME).
• Airspeed range 60 to 600 knots.
• Altitude management and display.
• Flight profile in Real or Compressed Time.
• Wind velocity, 0 to 99 kts, from any direction, steady or variable.
• Dead Reckoning Navigation Capability.
• Intuitive Multi-Gesture Operated User Interface.
• Touch Button Flying Controls.
• PopUp Toolbars & Annunciations to manage Flight Panel facilities.
• PopUp Toolbars and Icons to manage Chart facilities.
• Embedded – Getting Started Help.
• Printable Radio Navigation exercises with charts.

Verdict

If you’re an instructor, student, IFR or night candidate, flight simulator enthusiast or IFR rated pilot, I highly recommend RNS. It’s available by searching for “Radio Navigation Simulator” in iTunes or by clicking this link.

Gallery

Video Demonstration

This video by an unknown user is a little poor so I’ll try and do one myself sometime soon.

More images and information is available from the Digital Aviation website.

Original post and comments from: flight.org

iPad App Review: Radio Navigation Simulator

The 737 transition course content comprises of the following elements:

CBT – Computer Based Training
Fixed Base simulator training (10 two-hour sessions)
Engineering exam (3-hours, 80-questions)
Boeing performance/weight & balance ground school
Online courses: ILS/PRM, Low Vis Ops (LVO), GNSS Approaches and LAHSO.
Full motion simulator (8 four-hour sessions)
5 hour Boeing flight test
Company OPC (Operator Proficiency Check) & Instrument Rating Renewal
Company Line Training & Check to Line (around 50 sectors).

The Boeing check ride and company proficiency flight is followed by a further 3-week company induction program that includes typical elements such as emergency procedures, crew resource management, performance courses and about a dozen other subjects. It’s expected that the classroom components will last around three weeks and terminate a few days before commencement of (Sydney based) line training.

I’m writing this after enjoying the last of two days “off” after having just completed six 4-hour full flight simulator sessions (it’s likely I won’t post it until my 737 hell is over). The nature of the roster has me flying four hours a day in three day blocks – so course completion is expected around the 18th of March.

Fixed Base Training

I didn’t have overly high expectations of the 737 training after my 777 experience. At the risk of upsetting my Alteon instructor at the time (which is okay, I’m pretty sure he’ll never read this), he bordered on hopeless. He’d come from a line flying background in early Boeing types and apparently took the instructor job to supplement his new life working in a post office. Despite having an accomplished career, he simply didn’t have the instructional background necessary to effectively impart the necessary knowledge to fully understand the aircraft; nor did he have a passion for teaching. For that reason, the 777 training wasn’t much fun. At the same time, my simulator partner took on an aggressive captain persona because, in his own words, he wanted to “show command potential”. There are a massive number of elements that go into effective training and if any of those elements are sub-par, it can seriously compromise on the end result.

When we trained on the Boeing 777, we conducted our fixed base syllabus in the full motion simulator with motion activated from day one. Although it was perceived as an advantage at the time, I think that this type of introduction to the aircraft stole focus from the elementary instruction that was scheduled to take place (or at least it detracted our instructor from the primary focus). There was an overwhelming emphasis on flying the aircraft when, in reality, the emphasis during fixed base training should have been on flows, automation and systems. If the early instruction is deficient in any way it obviously devalues from the full flight sessions. However, The Brisbane Boeing facility treats fixed base instruction as it is intended – as training. The maturity of the organisation was evident from the first day.

The instructor allocated to us for training on the 737 was nothing shy of outstanding. In my entire flying career I’m yet to come across somebody that has a better understanding of the dynamics of learning than Yan. Yan’s flown for American Airlines, KLM and a few other operators in Europe and the United States. He’s accrued thousands of hours in various Boeing types – including over 6,000 in command on the Boeing 737. He’s a former Check Captain (TRE examiner) that was guided into simulator instruction after medical issues saw him grounded. Yan had us come in early for comprehensive classroom briefings that he delivered with a passion and enthusiasm that is completely uncommon from most simulator instructors. There simply wasn’t anything he couldn’t tell us or find in record time. I simply can’t speak highly enough of our fixed based tuition.

Our fixed based training was generally conducted between Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Canberra. All flights included a series of structured failures that progressively introduced us to the operation of various systems. All flights commenced and terminated at an airport gate for the purpose of emulating a real line flight.

Full Flight Instruction

The only difference between our fixed base trainer and the full motion simulator is the lack of motion in the former. Of course, there are other tools at the facility that includes basic posters, standalone FMC’s and computer trainers that are all designed to aid us in our own time. The cardboard frame below (the “brown bomber”) was something I laughed at on day one… and came to admire by day two.

The Brown Bomber

The instructor that was allocated to us for full motion instruction can only be described as “old school”. Coming from a TAA background, he has a much greater emphasis on checking than on training – and he wasn’t shy about letting us know from day one that proficiency was required in every session (despite not having flown programmed sequences). His instructional techniques were a little questionable at times (for reasons I’ll explain later). The class before us had nothing nice to say of the gentleman so we were less than impressed when we saw his name on our schedule. Just a few days ago, he criticised a go-around we flew (on the tail end of an approach outside of published stabilised approach criteria) citing “poor CRM” as the reason. Really? Poor CRM led to a sound and very valid decision? I’m not quite sure he appreciates how his derogatory comments and insulting remarks disengage his students. He’s a very nice guy… but his 1960′s captain personality isn’t overly compatible with a modern training environment. If I were paying for my own training, I would have certainly requested another instructor after our first session.

Boeing 737, Airbus A320 and Boeing 717 Simulators

This week we are due to complete the Boeing component of the course with another instructor that is well regarded by all that have flown with him (including Flight Podcast’s Adam Saddington). I’m looking forward to the change.

The full flight sessions are rather intense. So intense at times that it feels like we were tickling that fine line that borders on the region of negative learning. Since Boeing schedules everything in what essentially amounts to 10-minute increments, there’s no time to revisit areas of weakness once we’ve flown a programmed sequence. Company oversight during our 777 training meant that we often had additional time (and the resources) to explore our areas of weakness without the pressure of a rigid time schedule.

Boeing 777 versus the Boeing 737

It’s really not fair to compare the two aircraft… but I’ll do so anyway.

The 737 and 777 were designed well over 30 years apart – with the 777 designed almost exclusively using computer aided design. They’re completely different aircraft that reflect the available technology from the era in which they were built. It’s clear now (more than ever before) that the tripler also had a heavy emphasis on human factors in design. The most fascinating thing about transitioning between the two types is getting an insight into how design has evolved over the last couple of generations. It’s been over 20 years now since the 777 was first conceived… so my 737 MAX expectations are high!

The 737 isn’t a hard aircraft to fly (despite what I was told by many). It’s just that we – as the biological dump in the pilot seat – tend to inherit the many jobs that are allocated to more advanced and automated systems in newer types. Simply turning on the APU is a little bit of an ‘exercise’ in the 737 (attaching generators to the bus and re-routing air to the packs by closing valves etc). In the 777, it was a matter of turning the switch. This kind of manual intervention tends to repeat itself regardless of what system we’re dealing with. The philosophy that drove the design of the two aircraft are diametrically opposed – there’s simply no fair comparison.

As an example of the 737’s “complexity” – or lack of integrated automation – consider the simple question: “is the PFD annunciation  DISPLAY SOURCE  accompanied by a master caution light?” First, and just to add unnecessary confusion to the failure, the fault is only displayed as above in the air. On the ground, the same failure is indicated by a  CDU FAULT , and it is managed differently. The answer isn’t nearly as important as the understanding of why or how it happens (and the consequences). The  DISPLAYS SOURCE  failure indicates a failure of a DEU unit (which is manually identified, it’s not notified) meaning that it’s accompanied by an EEC failure at the same time (for engineering reasons that still confuse me – why force an EEC into a soft alternate mode when the live default mode seemingly provides more accurate data?). So, yes, a master warning (ENG) will accompany the failure; but it’s only because of the domino effect of failures and fallback into a “safe mode” that takes place. The 777 is far more advanced, and the failure could be managed quickly and easily with brainpower left over from an active game of angry birds.

The driftdown procedure (after the loss of an engine) in the 737 is a little archaic compared to the 777’s automated VNAV procedure. Again, this is an isolated procedure simply to illustrate the differences. In the 777, from the FMC CRZ page, you can command and execute a VNAV descent based on optimum altitudes and speeds. The driftdown is then flown in VNAV with autothrottle engaged (since, unlike the 737, the 777 has two autothrottles with one remaining functional after the loss of an engine). In the 737 however, it’s necessary to select altitude hold (which will open the MCP speed window and give us an MCP SPD FMA annunciation) before selecting the maximum altitude and manually selecting speed. The crew can then select LVL CHG to commence the descent in semi-basic modes. Of course, the 737’s thrust lever must be manually set to max continuous N1 since the thrust lever isn’t commanded by executed FMC values (the 737’s single autothrottle is disengaged in any engine shutdown checklist or memory item). The 737 speed reduction is a lot slower than the 777 (in level flight) so where I previously had seconds to program the same procedure in the 777, you’d almost be able to accomplish the same end result in the 737 while enjoying an in-flight meal. This fallback into basic modes repeats itself in most non-normal situations.

I certainly miss the TAC (Thrust Asymmetry Compensator). The technique we apply when handling the 737 on a single engine is virtually no different to the procedure we apply in general aviation multi-engine type. There are obviously distinct differences — the most notable being the controllability issues associated with aileron in any position other than completely wings level. Not unlike the 777, the effectiveness of spoilers seriously compromises on handling and performance. For reasons that still baffle me, we’re discouraged from using the rudder trim because, and I quote, we’ll “forget which engine has failed“… hmmm. A Boeing instructor was quick to tell us of the 777 pilots that had developed a reliance on TAC were prone to rolling the aircraft into a world of hurt after V1 cuts. With the favourable engine failed and an unwanted crosswind, full rudder and aileron is often initially required to maintain directional control. It’s in situations like these that you appreciate the damage automation has does to flying skills.

As a systems manager, the most notable absence from the front of the 737 cockpit compared to the 777 (I won’t start on the overhead jungle) is the advanced EICAS (Engine Indicating Crew Alerting System) and the ECL (Electronic Checklist). The management of failures is (more) easily accomplished in the 777 and leaves the crew free to manage other operational considerations. The EICAS in the 777 will generate various alerts on the Upper Display and list them by way of priority. The ECL will render each checklist in the order in which Boeing believes they should be completed. In the 737, we’re still using a Quick Reference Handbook (paper checklist) to manage all non-normal situations. Using the paper book seems to consume a lot of time that could be better spent managing whatever abnormality we’re carrying around the sky (again, a reflection of the aircraft’s age… and my lack inability to let go of the tripler). The Master Caution lights on the forward panel of the 737 is designed to simply make the pilot ‘look up’; It won’t alert the crew to indications Boeing considers is in your field of vision.

The 777 is very much a VNAV machine. Speed intervention (VNAV speed) is often used where – thus far, anyhow – the default mode on the 737 seems to be Level Change (I’m yet to start line training so this observation may be limited to simulator training). Far more time is spent punching numbers in the CDU chatting away with the FMC… while virtually any descent in the 777 can be made via the Mode Control Panel. This doesn’t make the 737 harder to fly… but it does make you appreciate the 777’s awesome operational ergonomics and automation.

Thus far, we haven’t engaged VNAV until after flap retraction (I’m familiar with using VNAV to command the vertical profile through latter climb segments). Instead, with a N1 FMA annunciation (commanded by programmed acceleration/thrust reduction altitudes), we manually “bug up” to the flaps up manoeuvring speed with the speed control on the MCP. I’m told VNAV can be engaged on the ground with the FMC Block 10.8 update that is installed on line aircraft (I guess I’ll find out soon), but it feels strange flying the aircraft in modes that don’t derive best performance from the aircraft. TOGA also behaves vastly different to its bigger stablemate… and it’s not uncommon for the aircraft to command fairly basic modes in manoeuvres such as the go-around – particularly at acceleration and flap retraction altitudes (more on this later).

Standard Operating Procedures

There’s always been the (very valid) internal argument that SOP’s should be rationalised between various fleets. When our long haul operation was started, the organisation was very fractionalised… so, sadly, the necessary communication between long haul and short haul managers was lacking. For that reason, we’ve had to learn entirely new mouth-music to accompany operation of the aeroplane for the very same condition of flight. There was always the issue of the correct thrust-handover technique that should be applied in the 777 and, after at least 12 months of internal discussion, it’s still different to the 737.

What do I miss?

So, what do I miss most about the 777 thus far? The ECL (Electronic Checklist), speed intervention on the MCP (to easily fly VNAV SPD profiles without digging into the FMC), EICAS (Engine Indication Crew Alerting System), TAC (Thrust Asymmetry Compensator), VNAV ALT (rather than ALT ACQ), and the simplicity of the automation. I’m guessing a lot of the 777’s features (and, perhaps, some from the 787) will make their way into the 737 MAX. All of a sudden, the crew rest doesn’t seem so important.

SevenThreeSeven.com

As a means of ensuring I maintain a commitment to learning the aircraft and its systems, I’ve decided that I’ll build (yet another) website that’ll consolidate all available information on the machine.

Next Time

Next time, I’ll post information on the last two full flight simulator sessions and the Boeing flight test.

As a side-note, I’ve used WordPress shortcodes to style FMA Annunciations and FMC Messages as described in this post on Internoetics.com. I’ve done so just for the sake of testing it out.

Original post and comments from: flight.org

Boeing 737 Transition: Week 2, 3 and 4

As of 8am this morning, the FlightAware aircraft tracking services will be available for Australian general aviation and commercial flights. FlightAware are the first (public) tracking service to provide this data for Australian airspace.

The Flight Aware services include:

• Nationwide Australian live flight tracking and status (private and commercial flights)
• Real-time maps with zoom/pan, map styles (e.g., satellite earth view), Google Earth integration
• Worldwide airport delays and airport status
• Mobile apps (iPhone, iPad, Android, BlackBerry, WP7, Symbian)
• Flight alerts (via email, text message, Facebook, Twitter) including pre-arrival notifications
• Flight radar track log (time, latitude, longitude, speed, heading) with graphs
• Gate assignments, times, and delays for airline flights
• Aircraft photos for over 100,000 aircraft, live aviation news, and aviation email newsletters

FlightAware CEO Daniel Baker said in a press statement that “FlightAware’s flight tracking technology and services are a tremendous tool for pilots, dispatchers, and airports, as well as airline passengers. We are excited to be able to expand our reach and offer all of our services to the Australian aviation community.”

FlightAware have a robust XML-based API that permits operators, FBO’s, geeks airport operators and developers to make use of the information available on the FlightAware servers for use in their own software, scheduling applications and/or passenger notification services. Most mobile applications that already source their data from FlightAware.com should be able to make the new information available almost immediately. Applications are already available for iPhone, iPad, Android, BlackBerry, WP7 and Symbian handsets. Our own (Android) application is in very early development and should be available this year.

Australian aircraft operators that do not wish for their flight details to appear on FlightAware.com can opt-out by contacting them via their website. FlightAware also offers a commercial product for operators that opt-out but would like to retain secure, selective access to their flight details.

Airports can be viewed by adding the four-letter ICAO airport code to the end of the access URL. For example, you can view Sydney data at http://flightaware.com/live/airport/YSSY and Brisbane data at http://flightaware.com/live/airport/YBBN.

Visit FlightAware’s website at FlightAware.com and follow them on Twitter at @FlightAware

Original post and comments from: flight.org

FlightAware Tracking Services Now Available in Australia